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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This case stems from an incident that occurred on February 17,2008 when the Defendant:

Bradley Green ("Green") was arrested by Hailey Police Officer Garth Davis for driving while
under the influence of alcohol ("DUI"). During Officer Davis' investigation of the DUI, and
subsequent arrest and blood alcohol testing procedures, Green requested that he be permitted to
discuss his situation with an attorney. The primary issue on appeal concerns whether Green's
due process rights as guaranteed by the Idaho and United States constitutions were violated
because he was denied access to counsel, notwithstanding repeated requests, during the critical
time when he was being requested to perform field sobriety tests, and also after he allegedly
refused to submit to a breath test at 2:03 a.m., up until the time that he was released from
custody, after posting bail at 4:40 a.m. Thus, this case questions whether the magistrate erred in
denying Green's Motion to Suppress based upon State v. Madden, 127 Idaho 894,908 P.2d 587
(Ct. App. 1995) and State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181,911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1996).

B.

THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRUL COURTAND ITS
DISPOSITION:
On February 17,2008 Green was issued a Uniform Citation by Hailey Police Officer

Garth Davis and charged with, in Violation # 1, "DUI Refusal" in violation of Idaho Code 5 188002(3)[sic] and in Violation # 2, with Resisting, in violation of Idaho Code 5 18-705.' R., p. 4.
As will be analyzed in greater detail, Green was initially charged with refusing a breath test but
later submitted to a blood draw that was conducted pursuant to a blood warrant. In any event,

lWith respect to Violation # 1, the "DUI Refusal" with the cite of 18-8002(3) it is not a criine
to refuse to submit to a breath test but it is, rather, a "civii" proceeding. Presumably, at some point,
the State will correct this mistake on the charging document. I. C. 5 18-8002 is Idaho's "Implied
Consent" statute: The crime of DUI is set forth in 18-8004.
APPELLANT'S %REF

-1

Green, through counsel, filed an appearance in the case and entered not guilty pleas to the
charges set forth in the citation. At the same time, Green filed a Special Notice of Appearance
and Conditional Request for a Show Cause Hearing pursuant to

5 18-~002(4)(b)~
with respect to

the BAC refusal case. Also, in the BAC refusal case, CV 08-160, Green filed a Motion to
Dismiss, the details of which are more fully set forth in his motion, and it was ultimately
dismissed by the magistrate in an order filed March 17,2008. R., pp. 12-14.
The order dismissing the BAC refusal proceedings was appealed by the State but was
ultimately dismissed by the district court on October 31,2008 for the State's failure to prosecute.
R., pp. 76-77.
With respect to the criminal action, Green filed a Motion to Suppress dated March 26,
2008 which requested "an order suppressing evidence obtained by Officer Garth Davis of the
Hailey Police Department on the grounds that it was illegally obtained in violation of the
Defendant's rights as guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the Idaho Constitution and all case law
interpreting the same." R., p. 17, Ls. 4-6. The theme of Green's Motion to Suppress was that his
rights were violated when he was denied access to counsel, or the use of a telephone to
communicate with counsel, throughout the entire investigation up until the point Green posted
bail and was released from the Blaine County Sheriffs Department. R., pp. 17-19. In particular,
the Motion to Suppress stated, i ~ t e cilia,
r
that: "[glranted, it may be that Green was not entitled to
consult with any attorney during the breath testing procedures at the Blaine County Sheriffs
Department but, certainly, once he was charged with a refusal at 2:04 a.m. he was entitled to
consult with a lawyer and was entitled to be provided access to a telephone to get that
accomplished." R., p. 19, Ls. 1-5.

An evidentiary hearing was held on Green's Motion to Suppress whereupon the parties
submitted memoranda of law and on June 4,2008 the magistrate filed its Memorandum Decision
and Order denying Green's Motion to Suppress. R., pp. 43-48.

2Unless otherwise noted, all references to statutes will be to those contained in the Idaho
Code.
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Subsequent to the magistrate's ruling, the parties entered into a Rule 11 Agreement
whereby Green agreed to enter a conditional guilty plea to the charge of driving while under the
influence of alcohol, 18-8004 and 18-8005(1), and the State agreed to dismiss the charge of
resisting and delaying a police officer. Through the Rule 11 Agreement, Green retained the right
to appeal the magistrate's Memorandum Decision and Order denying his Motion to Suppress and
on September 16,2008 the magistrate entered an Order Staying Proceedings on Appeal. On
October 24,2008 Green timely filed his Notice of Appeal bringing the matter before the district
court for appellate review of the magistrate's decision. After argument, the district court ruled
from the bench and on June 10,2009, filed an Order on Appeal affirming the magistrate's
decision. R., p. 1 11.
Green timely filed another Notice of Appeal bringing the matter before this court. R., pp.
113-117. A transcript was prepared of the evidentiary hearing relative to the Defendant's Motion
to Suppress that occurred on May 14, 2008.3
C.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.
The arresting officer in this case is Garth Davis, employed by the Hailey Police

De~artment.~
Other than his time as a reserve officer, Officer Davis had two and one-half years
experience as a law enforcement officers and was POST certified in 2006 and received training
on the enforcement and detection of Idaho's DUI laws.6
Officer Davis stopped Green's vehicle for speeding at approximately 1:06 a.m. on
February 17,2008 on Main Street in Hailey in the vicinity of Granite Street which is one block
south of McKercher B~ulevard.~
Green's velticle was stopped for traveling 38 mph in a 25 mph

%eferences to the Transcript on Appeal from Magistrate Division on the evidentiary hearing
conducted on May 14,2008 shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Tr."
'Tr., p. 6, Ls. 24-25; p. 7, Ls. 1-2.

51d.,p.7,Ls. 19-21;p.8,L. 1.
'Id.,p. 8, Ls. 14-17.
71d.,p. 11, Ls. 3-4,21-23; p. 12, L.l, Ls. 6-16.
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zone.' Officer Davis did not observe any other errant driving behavior nor had he received any
third-party information about the Green vehicle: Officer Davis did not have an arrest warrant?
The Green vehicle pulled over almost immediately near the vicinity of Granite Street!'
Officer Davis made contact with the driver, Green, and advised of the reason for the stop
and noted the odor of alcohol coming from Green, that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and
when asked, Green admitted to having one drink at the Mint Bar in Hailey." When asked, Green
appropriately produced his Washington driver's license whereupon a license check was
conducted by Officer Davis and he summoned backup. Officer Davis reapproached Green and
requested that he exit his vehicle to perfom what are commonly referred to as field sobriety tests
("FSTs"). However, Green indicated that he wanted to contact counsel so that he could be
advised what he should do. As found by the magistrate, the trial court found that "The Defendant
debated his circumstances with Officer Davis throughout the encounter. The Defendant
repeatedly requested legal counsel or assistance. Officer Davis told the Defendant he was not
entitled to such assistance. He eventually anested the Defendant, ostensibly for "refusing to
submit to evidentiary

test^."'^

But Officer Davis also testified that he told Green that he was not entitled to counsel
during the FSTs "because when [Green] signed up for his driver's license, Idaho had what's
called an implied consent Iaw."13 Also, Officer Davis further informed Green that the test that he
was going to use for alcohol testing were the field sobriety tests.I4

'Id, p. 13, Ls. 2-12

"Id., p. 15, Ls. 9-16
lZSee,R., p. 43, Ls. 7-1 1.
13See,Tr., p. 18, Ls. 20-24.

14Thisincorrect information, conveyed by Officer Davis to Green, becomes very important
when assessing whether Green's due process rights have been violated in conjunction with Green's
repeated request to spealc to counsel and the confusion that was created by Officer Davis' initial
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Officer Davis, thinking that FSTs were the evidentiary testing under the implied consent
law, placed Green under arrest "for refusing to submit to evidentiary testing."I5
As portrayed in Defendant's Exhibit A, when Officer Davis was requesting Green to
perform FSTs, Green would respond by saying that he would be happy to perform the tests once
he was able to communicate with counsel. Officer Davis advised Green that he would not be
permitted to communicate with counsel. According to Defendant's Exhibit A on the media timer
at 1:20, Officer Davis advised Green that if he would not perform the field sobriety tests he
would be placed under arrest for refusal to take evidentiary tests - and these evidentiary tests are
the FSTs.16 Green was placed under arrest at 1:28 a.m. and transported a short distance to the
Blaine County Sheriffs Department where Green was taken into the small room that housed the
Intoxilyzer 5000 breath testing machine.17 Once there, Green continued to ask for an attorney."
Officer Davis started the 15-minute observation period at 1:39 a.m.I9
The completion of the 15-minute waiting period20would have been at 1:54 a.m. and

statements in this regard, then coupled with the Notice of Suspension Advisory information as
required by 18-8002 and 18-8002A. All of this information is contained in Defendant's Exhibit A,
the CD recording.
15Zd, p. 20, Ls. 23-25; p. 21, Ls. 1-6.
16See,also, Defendant's Exhibit A, at 4:OO. "You stated when you signed for your license
you would submit to evidentiary testing and the FSTs are evidentiary testing."

l8See, Defendant's Exhibit A, 1:33
19Tr.,p. 24, Ls. 21-25; p. 25, Ls. 1-6.
'The Standard Operating Procedure - Breath Alcohol Testing Manual, Idaho State Police
Forensic Services (Revised 1212008, Effective Date 111512009) defines, in the glossary, that the
"waiting periodmonitoring perioddeprivation period: Mandatory 15-minute period prior to
administering a breath alcohol test, in which an officer monitors the test subject." See, Manual,
Glossary, p. i.
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Green was deemed to have refused to submit to the breath test by Officer Davis at 2:03 a.m.2'
when the Intoxilyzer 5000EN machine timed
During the deprivation period, Officer Davis played a tape that read the information
contained in the Notice of Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary Testing (Advisory for
$$ 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code) (hereinafter referred to as the "NOS Fornl"). See,
Defendant's Exhibit A. On Defendant's Exhibit A, the recording that read the NOS Form is
completed at 6:56. Shortly thereafter, at 720, Defendant's Exhibit A, Officer Davis reads the

NOS Form to Green since Officer Davis felt that Green had a hard time understanding some of
the language in the NOS Form - in particular, the implications of a suspension with a
Washington-licensed driver and Green's repeated requests to talk to a lawyer. For example, once
Officer Davis completed paragraph 3 on the NOS Form ("You do not have the right to talk to a
lawyer . . . .") Green aslced Officer Davis to explain that paragraph as he had always been advised
to request a lawyer if he ever found himself in a situation such as thisF3 Green advised Officer
Davis that he would be happy to submit to a breath test, if he could speak to counsel.
Defendant's Exhibit A at 13:09. Officer Davis would reply by telling Green he was not entitled
to speak to counsel. Green did not make an affirmative statement that he was refusing but,
rather, the breath testing machine "timed out" and printed its card showing a refusal.
Once Officer Davis was finished with the breath testing procedures, Green was taken
from the Intox room at the Blaine County Sheriffs Department and was escorted a short distance
into a conference room and the audio recording was stopped at that point.z4 Officer Davis then
filled out an Affidavit in Support of Blood Warrant. See, Defendant's Exhibit B. A fellow

21Tr.,p. 25, Ls. 6-1 1. See, also, the Intoxilyzerprint card, R., p. 5, which shows that arefusal
was printed on the card at 2:03 a.m. and that the "subject refused to continue."

22See,Intoxilyzer 5000 Operator's Training Manual (03/2007), p. 8. ". . .the instrument will
automatically print out a refusal if a sample is not obtained within (3) three minutes."

23See,also, Defendant's Exhibit A, for extensive discussions between Green and Officer
Davis on the confusion created by the suspension of driving privileges for out-of-state licensed
drivers.
24Tr.,p. 25, Ls. 16-24.
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officer transported the Affidavit in Support of Blood Warrant to Blaine County District Judge
Robert J. Elgee, at his residence, and the Blood Warrant was signed by Judge Elgee at 2:44 a.m.
It was not until 2:55 a.m. that Green was transported by Officer Davis from the Blaine
County Sheriffs Department to St. Luke's Hospital south of Ketchum. However, during the 52
minutes that Green was in custody with Officer Davis at the Blaine County Sheriffs Department,
he continued to request access to a lawyer but was denied.25 Green continued to request the right
to speak to counsel up until his blood was drawn at 3:30 a.m.26 Green bailed out of jail at 4:40

a.m.27
Officer Davis testified that it was his belief, based upon his training with the Hailey
Police Department, that Green was not entitled to speak to a lawyer until he bailed out jail.''

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

WERE GREEN'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS NOT
ALLOWED TO COMMUNICATE WITHAN ATTORNEY DURING THE INlTlAL STOP
BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY AFTER THE EVIDENTIARY PROCEDURE FOR
ALCOHOL TESTING WAS COMPLETED UP UNTIL HE WAS RELEASED FROM
JAIL?

B.

DID THE MAGISTRATE ERR INITS REASONING WHENIT DENIED GREEN'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS?

C.

SHOULD GREEN'S BLOOD TEST RESULTS BE SUPPRESSED FROM EVIDENCE?
III. ARGUMENT.

A.

GREEN'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN THE POLICE OFFICER
REFUSED TO ALLOW GREEN TO COMMUNICATE WITH COUNSEL.
The relevant times are as follows:

25Tr.,p. 27, Ls. 2-12.

261d.,p. 28, Ls. 8-11.
271d.,p. 30, L. 14.
281d.,p. 30, Ls. 21-25; p. 31, Ls. 1-3.
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(1)

Green was stopped by Hailey Police Officer Garth Davis at 1:06 a.m. for
speeding.

(2)

Green was arrested at 1:28 a.m. for rehsing to submit to evidentiary testing for
not performing FSTs.

(3)

Green was transported to the Blaine County Sheriff's Department and the 15minute deprivation period started at 1:39 a.m. and, thus, would be finished at 1:54
a.m.

(4)

Green was charged with a refusal at 2:03 a.m. and the evidentiary procedures for
breath testing under the implied consent law were completed.

(5)

An application for a blood warrant was sought and issued by The Honorable
Robert J. Elgee at 2:44 a.m.

(6)

Green was transported from the Blaine County Sheriffs Department to St. Luke's
Hospital at 2:55 a.m.

(7)

A blood draw was performed on Green at 3:30 a.m.

(8)

Green was released from jail at 4:40 a.m. after posting bond.

Instate v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181,911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1995), this Court agreed that
Carr's constitutional rights were violated when the police infringed upon Carr's effort to
communicate with counsel which also prompted the Court to conclude that Carr's rights to gather
exculpatory evidence and her right to a fair trial were frustrated. Before the trial court, Carr had
argued that those actions violated her rights as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the district court agreed, but this Court found
that the violations were based on a due process right.
Relying on Roberts v. State of Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (IS'Cir. 1995), the Carr court
observed that the due process clause of the United States Constitution prohibits deprivations of
life, liberty or property without "fundamental fairness" through govemental conduct that
offends the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play.
"The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,294,93 S. Ct. 1038, 1045,35 L. Ed.
2d 297 (1973). Due process, unlike some legal rules, "is not a technical
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."
Cafeteria Workersv. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,895,81 S. Ct. 1743,1748,6 L.
Ed. 2d 1230 (1961) (citation omitted.) Rather, "due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481,92 S. Ct. 2593,2600,33 L. Ed. 2d
484 (1972).
The test for determining whether state action violates procedural due process
requires a court to consider three distinct factors: (1) the private interests that
will be affected by the official actions; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the existingprocedures and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the
governmen~'sinterest, including the function involved and tlte fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail. Matthews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 3 19,335,96 S.
Ct. 893,903,47 L. Ed. 2d I8 (1976).

State v. Carr, 128 Idaho at 183-84.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38,785 P.2d 163 (1989) flirted
with the idea that the Idaho constitutional due process clause may be entitled to greater
"parameters of due process" than the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Id., 117 Idaho at 40. ("Today, we conclude that the scope is not
necessarily the same. We are prepared to consider the parameters of due process under Art. 1, 5
13 of our constitution without being necessarily bound by the interpretation given to due process
by the United States Supreme Court.") The Cootz court recognized that when the Idaho
Constitution was being formulated, even though the United States Constitution had a due process
clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, the drafters of our constitution nevertheless believed that
Idaho needed its own due process clause.
For, indeed, Green's case is fairly bizarre. It is clear that the officer has the choice on the
type of test that will be administered to a suspect to determine alcohol concentration. Matter of

Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364,744 P.2d 92 (1987). Even though Mr. Green did not possess an Idaho
driver's license, Officer Davis informed Green that once he signed for his driver's license he
gave his consent to submit to testing. Unwittingly, Officer Davis told Green that the test that he
was choosing to administer alcohol testing were the so-called field sobriety tests. In fact, Green
was arrested ostensibly for failing to submit to "evidentiary testing" for not doing FSTs.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Before the magistrate, Green argued that he was entitled to communicate with counsel,
based upoil his request to do so, shortly after the motor vehicle stop when Officer Davis
requested that he submit to field sobriety tests. The magistrate rejected that argument indicating
that that was not the law in Idaho and that "the right to counsel accrues when a person is subject
to a custodial interr~gation.'"~R., p.44. The magistrate then found that: "A person being
subjected to field sobriety tests is not subject to a custodial interrogation and does not have the
right to consult counsel." Id30 Although it may be true that a person is entitled to counsel in a
custodial interrogation that is based upon the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, clearly the magistrate erred in
making that conclusion because the Idaho Court of Appeals has found that a person after being
placed under arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol has, at least, a due process
right to communicate with counsel after a request by the accused to do so. State v. Carr, 128
Idaho 181,911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1995).
Despite fairly insistent urging by the Court of Appeals to hold otherwise, a number of
Idaho cases have ruled that a suspect is not entitled to communicate with counsel when deciding
to submit to a breath test. See, State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1,704 P.2d 733 (1985); Matter of

McNeely, 119 Idaho 182,804 P.2d 91 1 (Ct. App. 1990); Matter of Triplett, 804 P.2d 922 (Ct.
App. 1990):'

However, as far as counsel for the Appellant has discovered, no Idaho case has

addressed the issue on whether a suspect should be entitled to communicate with counsel, based
on a request to do so, once the officer is attempting to conduct field sobriety tests. In this case,
Green respectfdly urges this Court to find that there is a due process right to counsel once Green

29Themagistrate cited Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30Themagistrate cited State v. Hartwig, 112 Idaho 370, 372-74 (Ct. App. 1987). Then the
magistrate, in a footnote, observed that "Other parts of Hartwig have been superseded by statute as
recognized in State v. Howell, 122 Idaho 209 (Ct. App. 1992).
"It was in Tripleu that Justice Bumett on at least three separate occasions invited the Idaho
Supreme Court to re-examine the issue as to whether there is a constitutional right to counsel when
a driver is requested by a police officer to submit to a blood alcohol test pursuant to I. C. 3 18-8002.
It is worth noting that a petition for review was denied in Tripleft and thus far, the Idaho Supreme
Court has not revisited the issue.
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was requested to perform the so-called field sobriety tests - especially in this case. Green's
argument is highlighted by the completely erroneous information that was being conveyed by
Officer Davis. Officer Davis was telling Green that he had to submit to field sobriety tests under
Idaho's Implied Consent Law and he agreed to do that when he signed up for his driver's license.
Officer Davis also informed Green that the officer had the right to choose which alcohol
concentration test would be given and that Officer Davis was choosing the field tests under
Idaho's implied consent statute. Officer Davis informed Green that he did not have the right to
communicate with counsel since, in Officer Davis' view he had implicated the statutory
provisions of Idaho's implied consent law and thus was not entitled to consult with counsel. But
certainly due process would envision the right to counsel in this situation so that Green could
have been properly advised on whether to submit to field sobriety tests.
However, once Green was placed under arrest for refusing to submit to the field sobriety
tests under Idaho Code 5 18-8002(3) and resisting arrest, R., p.1, Green should have been entitled
to communicate with counsel, based upon his request to do so, up until Idaho's implied consent
statute was engaged.
It is Green's position that it is only during the time that Idaho Code 3 18-8002 is being
applied that he does not have the right to counsel. The McNeely court referred to the application
of Idaho's implied consent law as an "evidentiary procedure'"2 and the implied consent statute is
engaged once the police officer started reading the Notice of Suspension Advisory Form to Green
at 1:39 a.m. and the statute's application ended once Officer Davis charged Green with a refusal
at 2:03 a.m. when Green did not submit to a breath test.33
Section 18-8002(2) provides that "such person shall not have the right to consult with an
attorney befove submitting to such evidentiary testing. " (Emphasis added.) Thus, affer either
submitting to evidentiary testing, or refusing to submit to the test, a suspect should be entitled to
consult with counsel, along with reasonable means to do so, if the suspect makes a request to

"Mattev ofMcNeely, 119 Idaho at 187,
33Again,Green informed Officer Davis that he would be happy to submit to a breath test once
he was given an opportunity to communicate with counsel.
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communicate with an attorney. Officer Davis requested that Green snbmit to a breath test and
the critical time within which the evidentiary procedure for h e breath test under Idaho's implied
consent law was completed occurred at 2:03 a.m.
The Idaho Court of Appeals in Matter ofMcNeely, 119 Idaho 182,804 P.2d 91 1 (Ct. App.
1990, Pelitionfor Review Denied 1991) viewed testing for BAC under the implied consent statute

as an "evidentiary procedure." See, Id,, 119 Idaho at 187. Once that evidentiary procedure is
completed, the statute's prohibition against consultation with counsel ends. For it must be
remembered that during the subsequent efforts to obtain a blood warrant, that was not done under
Idaho's implied consent law but under a completely different procedure - a search of the
Defendant's person under the Fourth Amendment - by drawing blood that was being permitted by
a blood warrant. Indeed, the time that was spent by Officer Davis to obtain a blood warrant was
not necessary since the Idaho Appellate Courts have concluded, beginning in 1989 withstate v.
Woolevy, 116 Idaho 368,370,775 P.2d 1210,1212, that search warrants for DUI blood draws are
not necessary so long as there is probable cause to talce blood. More recently, the Idaho Supreme
Court in State v Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739, reaffirmed and concluded that a search
warrant is not necessary under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor
required under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution since the extraction of blood in a
DUI investigation fit within an exception to the wmant requirement so long as the officer had a
sufficient factual basis to draw blood.
It is important to recognize the nuance, and the difference, that permits an evidentiary
procedure for BAC under Idaho's implied consent law and a blood draw as permitted under the
Fourth Amendment and as more fully analyzed instate v. Woolery. They are based upon two

different rationales: one was implied consent and the other was exigent circumstances.
What this means, then, is that if the State is free to go about securing and seizing
evidence, so should Green and his opportunity to do that commenced at 2:03 a.m . Certainly,
during the time that Green was held in a conference room with Officer Davis from 2:03 until
2 5 5 a.m., Green should have been provided the opportunity to communicate with counsel.
There is no evidence that if Green were allowed to call his lawyer, it would have disrupted the
proceedings.
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This Court has previously considered this issue and has ruled that if a suspect requests to
speak to an attorney after implied consent proceedings are finished, they must be honored. That
issue, decided by this Court, State v. Madden, I27 Idaho 894,908 P.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1995)
where the defendant agreed to submit to the first sample on a breath test, but rehsed to give a
second sample and while being booked into jail requested an independent blood test and asked
that she be allowed to speak to her attorney. The jailer at the Blaine County Jail informed
Madden that according to policy, she would have to wait until booking procedures were
completed to make any telephone calls. Madden was arrested at 11:05 p.m. and, the opinion
indicates, that at approximately 1:00 a.m. the arresting officer received a call from the jailer
advising that Madden wished to obtain a blood test. The arresting officer informed the jailer that
Madden would have to get to the hospital on her own and arrange for the test.
At approximately 2:30 a.m. and approximately three and one-half hours after she was
originally stopped, and 30 minutes after booking was completed, Madden was allowed to
telephone her attorney. After speaking to her attorney, Madden again requested a blood test and
her lawyer contacted the jailer who requested that Madden be transported to the hospital which,
at the time, was only blocks away, for a blood test. The jailer, once again, contacted the arresting
officer to advise of the status and the deputy informed the jailer that Madden could get a blood
test after posting bond.
The Court of Appeals' Opinion does not disclose when Madden was released from
custody, nor does it discuss whether Madden ever made arrangements for a blood draw?4
Madden's BAC result on the first sample showed ,211.
The Idaho Supreme Court instate v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989)
recognized an "inherent exigency" in DUI cases due to the destruction of evidence by the
metabolism of alcohol in the blood. That inherent exigency applies to both parties - the State and
the Defendant - and, in particular, Green was entitled to consult counsel to be advised on whether
he should reconsider submitting to the breath test or be advised to make arrangements for an
independent blood test.
341twas obviously not relevant to the Court of Appeals in Madden and the Court did not take
issue with failing to get a blood test.
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By refusing her access to a telephone for approximately two hours after her
initial request for an independent test and three and one-half hours after her
arrest, the officers denied Madden a meaningful and timely opportunity to
make her own arrangements for an additional test.

State v. Madden, 127 Idaho at 589.
In its conclusion, the Madden court said:
Under the facts of this case, the Blaine County Sheriff Department's policy
prohibiting an arrestee from making a telephone call until after the bool-ing
process denied Madden a meaningful opportunity to obtain an additional
BAC test pursuant to I. C. (i 18-8002(4)(d). Consequently, the results of the
breath test were inadmissible and should have been suppressed.

Id., at589-590.
Thus, it can be seen from Madden that an important part of the decision in affirming the
magistrate's decision was the failure to provide access to consult with counsel way before
Madden was released from jail on bail. It was two hours after the arrest and shortly after the first
breath test that Madden stated she wanted a blood test and to speak to her lawyer. There is
helpful guidance in Madden on Green's issue that is squarely before the Court.
However, another case decided by the Court of Appeals the same day Madden was issued
further solidifies the right of a DUI arrestee to communicate with counsel once such a request is
made.35State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 91 1 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1996) involved a situation more on
point to Green's case. Carr was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol and was
transported to the police station.
Before Officer McCloud conducted an evidentiary breath test, and while he
was reading the standard police advisory form aloud to her, Carr requested
access to a telephone in order to contact an attorney. Consistent with I. C. (i
18-8002(2), McCloud informed Can that she had no right to consult with an
attorney prior to taking the breath test. McCloud also informed Carr that
after taking the State's breath test, she could obtain an additional test at her
own expense. Carr agreed to take the breath test, which yielded results of .20
and .21.
McCloud then took Can. into a holding cell during which time Can asked

35Carrdid not become final until March 8,1996 when a Petition for Review was denied by
the Idaho Supreme Court.
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when she could speak to an attorney. McCloud informed Carr that she could
"make any phone calls as soon as the jail personnel were ready to let her
make the phone calls." At some point, McCloud prepared the Uniform
Citation, charging Carr withmisdemeanorDUI, I. C. 3 18-8004(1). McCloud
then departed and Carr made several requests of other officers to contact an
attorney. The officers denied her request. Approximately five hours after her
arrest, Carr was provided access to the telephone, and she contacted a
bondsman.

Id., 128 Idaho at 182.
The opinion is silent as to whether Carr ever made contact with an attorney or made
arrangements for some type of independent test. It is clear, however, that Carr did not request an
independent test: only that she be able to call a lawyer. Carr filed a motion to dismiss the DUI
charge based upon a violation of her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the United
States Constitution and that "she was denied the right to a fair trial." The magistrate denied the
motion, Carr entered a conditional guilty plea, and the district court reversed. The case then
proceeded to the Idaho Court of Appeals.
The issue in Carr was whether her constitutional rights were violated when the state
denied her request to telephone an attorneyfollowing the administration of the State's BAC test.
(Emphasis in the O p i n i ~ n .Id,,
) ~ ~128 Idaho at 183. In Carr, the district court, when reversing
magistrate ruled that "Carr was prejudiced by the State's failure to allow her to gather her own
evidence concerning her blood alcohol level. The only evidence concerning her blood alcohol
level is that which was gathered by the state. Therefore, the correct remedy is the suppression of
the state's evidence which could have been contested by Can had she been allowed to gather her
own evidence of her blood alcohol level." In her motion to dismiss the DUI charge, Carr argued,

inter alia, that she "was prevented from obtaining an independent blood test to prove her
innocense." Thus, even though Carr had not specifically requested an independent blood test,
she did request an opportunity to consult with counsel and it was an implicit deduction in the
36Thisis the point being made by Green, which was picked up and emphasized by the
opinion in Carr, that although a DUI suspect cannot consult with an attorney during the implied
consent procedure, once it is completed by either submitting to a breath test or refusing it, then the
implied consent statute is completed and both parties are entitled to go about gathering independent
evidence due to the "inherent exigency" in DUI cases.
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opil~ionthat she would have been advised to seek an independent test.
Even though Carr raised a Sixth Amendment argument, the Court of Appeals did not
specifically address that claim but, rather, upheld the district court's decision to suppress the
evidence based upon due process claims. "The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the state's accusations."

Id., 128 Idaho at 184. Again, not chiding Carr for failing to request an independent blood test,
the decision turned on her request to communicate with counsel: the same as Green.
The private interest affected in this case is Carr's interest in procuring
evidence which would challenge the results of the State's BAC test. By
denying Carr's access to a telephone for approximately five hours after her
arrest for DUI, the State denied her the means by which she could establish
her defense. As recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court, an "inherent
exigency" exists in a DUI setting, due to the destruction of evidence by
metabolism of alcohol in the blood. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370,
775 P.2d 1210,1214 (1989). Therefore, the only opportunity for a defendant
in a DUI case to gather exculpatory evidence is within a reasonable time
following arrest and the administration of the state's BAC test. See, Tacoma
v. Heater, 67 Wash.2d 733,409 P.2d 867, 871 (1966). (denial of right to
contact attorney following issuanceofcitation for DUIprevented defendant's
effective preparation of defense because "evidence of intoxication dissipates
with the passage of time."37)

As aresult, when aperson is arrestedfor DUI andgiven an evidentiary BAC
test, thatperson must be allowed, at a minimum, to make aphone call upon
request to do so. Such contact provides the means through which the arrestee
is able to gather evidence intending to refute the state's evidence of
intoxication and thereby preserve the "right to a fair opportunity to defend
against the state's accusations." Chambers, supra. For example, the person
contacted by the arrestee could facilitate the administrationof an independent
BAC test, a right guaranteed by I. C. 5 18-8002(4)(d). Indeed, many states
have held that due process requires that a DUI defendant be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to obtain an independent blood test as such test
assures the defendant's right to gather exculpatory evidence. [Citations
omitted.]

371nterestingly, Tacoma v. Heater, supra, cited with approval by Carr, the Washington
Supreme Court, en banc, found that a DUI suspect had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
similar protections under the Washington Constitution after arrival at the jail.
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Allowing an individual arrested for DUI to make a telephone call once the
state administers its evidentiary BAC test ensures that arrestee will be given
the opportunity to obtain exculpatory evidence. Indeed, without timely
access to atelephone, there is littIe likelihood of successfullychallenging the
state's evidence of intoxication.

Id., 128 Idaho at 184 - 185.
Accordingly, based upon the Court's holding in Carr, Green's due process rights were
violated when he was denied access to communicate with counsel despite repeated requests to do
so. The only distinguishing feature between Green and Carr is that Can agreed to submit to the
requested BAC test and Green refused. As explained earlier, this distinguishing feature is of no
moment. The critical step that must be completed is the implied consent procedures and those
are completed by either the suspect agreeing to submit to the BAC test or the suspect refusing.
Once done, the implied consent statute's prohibition against communication with counsel ends
and the defendant's due process rights are put in place. It makes no difference if he agrees to
take the breath test or refuses, either way, once that final step has been taken, the defendant has
the right to communicate with counsel if he makes a request to do so and he has the right just like
the State to go about gathering evidence.
Especially in this case, there were not any justifiable reasons to prohibit Green from
communicating with counsel while he sat in the conference room at the Blaine County Sheriffs
Department from 2:03 a.m. until 2:55 a.m. If allowed to do so, Green's communication with
counsel would not, in any way, have interrupted or delayed the State's investigation and the
unnecessary delay caused by the State in securing a blood warrant.
Furthermore, as the Carr case indicates, an independent test is not limited to a blood test
or breath test.
In addition, as noted by Carr, the person contacted by the arrestee could
arrange for a photograph to be taken to demonstrate that the arrestee's eyes
were not bloodshot but clear and white; prepare a tape recording to
demonstratethat the arrestee had clear speech; video tape the arrestee to show
that he or she has balance and is able to walk in a straight line; perform agaze
nystagmus test to show smooth eye pursuit at all angles; or simply serve as
a witness to observe the aforementioned characteristics of sobriety. As
demonstrated, the interest affected in this case is substantial.
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Id., 128 Idaho at 184-185.
"Therefore, a detainee's opportunity to gather exculpatory evidence in such cases lasts
only a short time following the arrest and administration of the state's testing." State v.

Cantrell, 139 Idaho 409, 80 P.3d 345 (Ct. App. 2003).

B.

THE MAGISTRATE ERRED INDENYING GREEN'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
The magistrate found in its Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 4:
1. As a result of these cases [Madden and Carr],there is little doubt that
upon completion ofthe state's attempts to gather evidence in the present case,
the defendant had the right to consult counsel and arrange for the gathering
of exculpatory evidence.
The magistrate erred when it held that the defendant's right to communicate with counsel

did not attach until the state completed its gathering of evidence: Clearly, that is not the law
under State v. Carr. As noted above, the due process right to communicate with counsel attaches
once the BAC evidentiary procedures under the implied consent law have completed so long as
the detainee requests to speak with counsel. So long as there is no interrupt or delay in the
State's investigation, the inherent exigency that is in place demands that Green be afforded an
opportunity to place a call to a lawyer.
Othemise, as can so clearly be seen from the circumstances in Green, if he is not allowed
to communicate with counsel until he is released from jail at 4:40 a.m., then the entire thesis and
holdings of Madden and Carr would be eviscerated. In particular, the State would not have
suffered any type of delay or impediment during the time between 2:03 a.m. - when the implied
consent BAC evidentiary procedures were completed - and the time that Green was transported
to St. Luke's Hospital at 2:55 a.m. And, also, Green submits that he should have been allowed
to communicate with counsel once he arrived at the hospital before blood was drawn at 3:30 a.m.
and the intervening time thereafter up until he was released from jail.
It must be remembered that the State does not have the right to draw blood under the
implied consent statute if the officer elects to use a breath test. The only time a second
evidentiary test can be conducted under the implied consent statute is if the circumstances under
18-8002(10) exist, the circumstances of which were not present in Green's case. Rather, the
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State's ability to obtain a blood draw is allowed under a different legal basis as allowing a blood
warrant. To reiterate, if the State is free to go about gathering incriminating evidence during this
critical time of "inherent exigency" then the Defendant must be allowed, under the due process
clauses, to seek out his own exculpatory evidence.
2. The magistrate erred when it concluded that "It took approximately an hour to reach
the conclusion that the defendant was not going to take the breath test. Most of this delay was
caused by the defendant's refusal to cooperate and the police officer's patient attempt to answer
the defendant's questions and advise him of his rights." See, R., p. 46.
By considering the relevant times of the stop, arrest, transportation to Blaine County
Sheriffs office, the starting of the 15-minute deprivation period and the time on the Intoxilyzer
card, and by listening to the audio recording on Defendant's Exhibit A, the magistrate erred in
reaching these conclusions.
Green should not be faulted for making the effort to understand and exercise his legal
rights in wanting to seek the advice of counsel. Especially when considering the incorrect
information being given by Officer Davis about the implied consent law and that the evidentiary
test was going to be the field sobriety test. Stopped at 1:06 a.m., arrested at 1:28 a.m.,
transported to Sheriffs Department and 15-minute deprivation period started at 1:39 a.m.,
completed at 1 5 4 a.m. and refusal at 2:03 a.m. - Green did not cause a delay.
3.

The magistrate erred when it concluded that "at approximately 3:30 a.m., the police

had a blood draw performed on the defendant pursuant to a warrant. Again, the delay, if any, in
obtaining this blood draw can be attributed to the general lack of cooperation by the defendant
and the time it took to obtain the warrant and transport the defendant to a medical facility." Id
Based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings instate v. Woolery and State v. Diaz,
and contrary to what the magistrate found in this case, the delay was caused by Officer Davis in
applying for a blood warrant that was not even necessary. Green also takes issue with the
magistrate's statements that there was a general lack of cooperation by Green when, clearly, at
that point he was entitled to communicate with counsel but it was refused by Officer Davis.
4.

All of the findings made by the magistrate on page 5 of the Memorandum Decision,

R., p. 47, as explained above, do not comport with the actual facts and the law and paragraph 3 of
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the Memorandum Decision and Order, R., p. 47, is not a relevant consideration under Carr. It
does not matter if the detainee does not call a lawyer once they are allowed to use a telephone.

5.

At page 5 of the Memorandum Decision and Order, R., p. 47, the Magistrate

observed that "This is a close call because the case law makes sure that priority should always be
given to a person attempting to preserve or obtain exculpatory evidence. At the same time, it

does not give aperson the right to unnecessarily delay an ongoingpolice investigation and then
claim that he wasprejudiced by that delay. " (Emphasis added.)
Close calls are not decided in favor of the State but rather should be made to uphold a
defendant's rights. The only unnecessary delay in this case was caused by Officer Davis' refusal
to allow Green to talk to a lawyer and then the critical time that was wasted by going about
obtaining a blood warrant that was not necessary.
Finally, the magistrate makes a couple of comments about how Green delayed the
booking process once they returned from the hospital because he refused to give his social
security number. One can see that based upon the current state of affairs, Green was probably
justified in refusing to offer up his social security number but it appears that Green did give that
information without much delay. While at the booking window, Officer Davis apparently had a
discussion with the jailer that if Green did not give his address and social security number, they
"would throw him in the drunk tank until he could remember that information." Once that
discussion occurred, Green quickly remembered the information and there is no evidence that
Green was thrown in the drunk tank.38

C.

THE APPROPRUTE REMEDY FOR THE VIOLATION OF GREEN'S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS WOULD BE SUPPRESSION OF THE STATE'S BLOOD TEST RESULTS.
In the event this Court agrees with Green's analysis and finds that the magistrate

committed reversible error, then the appropriate remedy under Madden and Carr would be
suppression of the State's blood test results and other evidence of Green's alleged intoxication.

38See,Tr., p. 26, Ls. 23-25; p. 27, Ls. 1-6.
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IT/: CONCLUSION
Based upoil the foregoing, it is Green's position that his due process rights and his right
to a fair trial as guaranteed by both the United States and Idaho constitutions were violated by the
State's failure to provide reasonable means to contact counsel. Consistent therewith, Green
respectfully submits that the magistrate's order denying his motion to suppress be reversed and
that not only the results of the State's blood draw be suppressed but, as Judge Lansing points out
in her Specially Concurring Opinion in State v. Carr, all other evidence and observations of
Green's intoxication made by any State agent be suppressed; i.e., odor of alcohol, slurred speech,
glassy, bloodshot eyes, demeanor, balance and dexterity allegedly displayed at the scene up until
the time he was released from custody at 4:40 a.m.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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